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The Appellant Summit County submits this Reply Brief. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action below involved an appeal of a decision by the 
Summit County Board of Adjustment (the "Board") upholding the 
Director of Community Development's (the "Director's") decision 
to deny Appellee, Red Barn Development, L.C. ("Red Barn"), a 
building permit because Red Barn had not procured a final site 
plan approval from Summit County (the "County"). 
Red Barn is mistaken that the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code (the "Code") "sets forth differing procedures [for obtaining 
building permits] depending upon whether the development is a 
permitted use or a conditional use within certain zones." 
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 3). Although it is true that some 
development requirements may differ, depending upon the use, it 
is not true that the procedure for obtaining a building permit 
varies. Sections 4.12, 5.17, and 6.14 of the Code and the 
Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines (the "Guidelines"), 
Sections 12.1 & 12.2 set forth the same procedures for obtaining 
a building permit regardless of the type of use. 
Additionally, Red Barn's insistence that the County, outside 
of the site plan issue, "made no other objection to Red Barn's 
Application" is misleading. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 5). In 
truth, the County did not proceed with a review of the Red Barn 
building permit application after it was discovered that no final 
1 
site plan had been obtained. (R. 284; 320-21; 326-27) . 
Consequently, no further objection was stated because no further 
review had been conducted. 
RESPONSE TO APPELLEES SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Red Barn asserts that "Summit County attempts to rewrite the 
Development Code, through its tortured interpretation, so as to 
impose requirements upon Red Barn which are not contained within 
the plain language of the Development Code." (Appellee's Brief, 
pp. 6). This simply is not true. 
The County's argument is not twisted or distorted, nor even 
tortured, but well reasoned and very practical. In simple terms, 
the County's argument is thus: 
(1) The Snyderville Basin Development Code is divided into 
two areas: zoning regulations, which define the uses and 
densities of a property (Chapter 3 ) , and permitting 
regulations, which implement the zoning through development 
permits (Chapters 4-7). Chapter 1 is devoted to 
administrative information and Chapter 2 are definitions. 
(2) Section 3.6(a)(1) of the Code discusses "permitted 
uses" within the context of zoning. That Section clearly 
states that a "permitted use" is implemented through a 
"development permit." All parties concede that Red Barn's 
Timberwolf Lodge project is a "permitted use" within the 
Resort Commercial Zone District. Section 3.1(b)(8). 
(3) A "development permit" is defined in Section 2.2(43) to 
include a "building permit," as well as a "final site plan." 
(4) Both the Snyderville Basin Development Code and Utah 
state law require a "building permit" be issued prior to 
starting construction of any development. Section 4.12(a) & 
U.C.A. 17-27-1002(2)(b). Consequently, Red Barn must obtain 
a "building permit" prior to commencing construction of its 
project. 
(5) The requirements for all "development permits" are 
found in Chapter 4 of the Code. Consequently, it is no 
great surprise that the requirements for a "building permit" 
are principally found in Section 4.12(b). A literal reading 
of that section requires a plat and final site plan for all 
development activity as a prerequisite for a "building 
permit." This standard is stricter than the County Land Use 
Development and Management Act (the "Act"), which requires 
plats only on subdivisions of land. U.C.A. 17-27-804. 
However, the Act clearly states that the County may impose 
stricter regulations if it so chooses. U.C.A. 17-27-104(1). 
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(6) The Snyderville Basin Administrative Guidelines (the 
"Guidelines"), which were enacted by the County Commission 
at the same time as the original Code (R. 289), are meant to 
help assist the County and applicants in the "administration 
and implementation of the Code." Guidelines, Section 2. 
Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines, which discusses "building 
permit" requirements and is meant to assist in implementing 
Section 4.12 of the Code, interprets Section 4.12(b) to mean 
that either a "minor permit," "final subdivision plat" or 
"final site plan" is required prior to issuance of a 
"building permit." 
(7) This interpretation of Section 4.12(b), as requiring 
that at least one of those aforementioned development 
permits (minor permit, final subdivision plat, or final site 
plan) be approved prior to issuance of a "building permit," 
has been a consistent position within the County since the 
Code's original adoption in January 1993. (R. 307-08). 
This position is also very fair to property owners in that 
the County's interpretation of the Code has been done in the 
least restrictive fashion. See Patterson v. Utah County 
Board of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 606 (Utah App. 1995). 
The more restrictive alternative interpretation would be to 
ignore Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines and require all 
4 
projects, to include Red Barn, to submit both a site plan 
and plat for approval.1 As can easily be seen by this 
forthright analysis, Red Barn's position that Section 
4.12(b) should be ignored with regard to "permitted uses" 
is unreasonable, violative of the plain language of the Code 
section, and inconsistent with the rules of statutory 
construction noted on pages 29-31 of the Brief of the 
Appellant Summit County. 
(8) In sum, the only question remaining in this logical 
sequence is to determine which one of the three prerequisite 
permits applies to Red Barn. The County has always asserted 
that the one which applies to Red Barn is a matter of common 
sense, logic, and plain statutory language. 
(a) Red Barn admits that its project is neither a 
subdivision, which requires a plat under State law and 
Section 4.7 of the Code (R. 289), nor a "lot of record" 
which would require a Minor Permit under Sections 
2.2(65) Sc (69) of the Code and Chapter 15 of the 
Guidelines. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 15, footnote #3). 
1
 It is interesting to note that when Red Barn attacks the 
language of Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines, it consistently 
fails to mention that the County's reading of such in conjunction 
with Section 4.12(b) is in Red Barn's favor. 
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(b) Consequently, that leaves the Red Barn project 
subject to a final site plan. 
(9) This is only logical, as site plans are typically used 
to evaluate commercial and multi-family projects, such as 
the Timberwolf Lodge project proposed by Red Barn. See 
Mandelker, Land Use Law 4th ed., Section 6.68, pp. 279-80 
(1997) . 
(10) This logical sequence is also confirmed by Section 
6.14(a) (1) wherein the Code expressly requires a "final site 
plan" for Red Barn's commercial/multi-family use project. 
Even the Appellee's own architect has admitted that we 
should not be splitting hairs about whether a "site plan 
need[s] to be done, because clearly, they get done and they 
get approved and they have all of the information that we 
would have otherwise." (R. 287). 2 This admission was 
relied upon by the Board in their findings. (R. 316). 
2
 The architect's argument with the County has been over 
who does the review, the County's planning staff or the planning 
commission. In his view point, it should be the staff. (R. 
287). However, Section 4.6 requires action by both the planning 
and county commissions. 
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As one can see, the County's argument is a logical progression 
through the Code.3 It is well reasoned and consistent with how 
projects, such as Red Barn's, are evaluated by many 
jurisdictions. To deny the County its ability to evaluate this 
project through site plan review is to negate the County 
Commission's legislative intent to implement zoning through a 
detailed permitting system which allows for public input and a 
recommendation from its planning commission. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DECISIONS OF A BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT ARE ACCORDED SUBSTANTIAL 
DEFERENCE• 
Red Barn correctly agrees with Summit County that "when 
reviewing the decision of a board of adjustment, a trial court 
may determine 'only whether or not the decision is arbitrary, 
capricious, or illegal.'" (Appellee's Brief, pp. 7). Red Barn 
goes on to assert that the interpretation of the Code in the 
present case by the Board constituted illegal action and thus the 
Board's decision is subject to "de novo" review. (Appellee's 
Brief, pp. 7-8). 
Red Barn mentions in brief its perception that the County 
has attempted to rewrite its Code through a tortured 
interpretation. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 6). However, to 
3
 For a detailed discussion of the County's reasoning, see 
Brief of the Appellant Summit County, pp. 32-41. 
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interpret the Utah State Legislature's intent behind the 
statutory standard of review as (1) defining any disagreement by 
a party with a board of adjustment's interpretation of its own 
code as illegal, and (2) requiring "de novo" review in all such 
cases, is truly tortured and could never have been the 
legislative intent. As noted on pages 19-21 of the Brief of the 
Appellant Summit County, no "de novo" review is allowed by 
statute. Where the board's decision is supported by substantial 
evidence, it is affirmed. U.C.A. 17-27-708(6). As Judge Bench 
of the Utah Court of Appeals has stated: 
When interpreting regulations such as a zoning 
ordinance, "a reasonable administrative interpretation 
and practice should be given some weight." Salt Lake 
City v. Salt Lake County, 568 P.2d 738, 741-42 (Utah 
1977). Given the technical expertise of the County's 
zoning and planning department, it is in a much better 
position than we are to achieve the desired goal of 
proper zoning as determined by the County Commission. 
We therefore must defer to its administrative 
interpretation of its own zoning ordinances. see Sandy 
City, 827 P.2d at 218; accord Cottonwood Heights 
Citizens Ass'n v. Board of Comm'rs, 593 P.2d 138, 140 
(Utah 1979); cf. Morton Int'l, Inc. v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 814 P.2d 581, 586 (Utah 1991) ("The dispositive 
factor [in determining whether to defer to an agency's 
interpretation of a statute] is whether the agency, by 
virtue of its experience or expertise, is in a better 
position than the courts to give effect to the 
regulatory objective to be achieved.") 
Furthermore, the majority's activist approach exceeds 
the limited review mandated by the Utah Supreme Court 
in Phi Kappa Iota Fraternity v. Salt Lake City, 116 
Utah 536, 212 P.2d 177 (1949): 
There are, of course, various solutions for 
zoning problems such as this; and opinions 
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rn.ay differ as to which is the most 
efficacious. But it is not for the court to 
weigh the respective merits of these 
solutions. That is the duty which lies upon 
the shoulders of the governing body . . . If 
changes have developed which indicate [the 
need for a different approach], that is a 
matter for submission to the commission; and 
not r/Lie r . * •" h-: • *:>urt" s . 
Id. 212 P.2d aL 181. See also Euclid v. Ambler Realty 
Co. , 272 U.S. U"5, 393, -\r? S.Ct . 1 Z-\ . "2'; 'r. L.Ed. 30? 
(1926; ( "We hav- nothing to do with the question of -h-
wisdom or good policy of municipal ordinances.") 
TOWn Of Alt .t :—, .;-.i::.,:: ^ ^ , l > ,,g'ui ,, : . . ; 7 fT1*7^u 
App. 1992- ' Bench, dissenting hree years L^rre:, : 
Patterson, trie '"out - Appeals clenr1. ^  • r i : • r -j ? <ye 
Bench's -<f • ~-• f * ' * ... ; :.-. , ..-. t, \;J^ s u t c o: J"ah as 
to the .. m-i i- t judicial review of a I- raliry's interpretation 
of its own zoning ordinance, 893 P.?,d >V' £0fi. Consequently, 
11
 rtubstarilid.1 deference, " not "de novo" review is the current 
state of the law,4 
4
 In the majority opinion of Ben Hame Corp. , Judge Jackson 
cites to a non-board of adjustment case, Burley Lagoon Imp. Ass'n 
v. Pierce Co., 686 P.2d 503, 505 (Wash. App. 1984), for the 
proposition that: courts review ordinances as questions of law. 
However, recognizing the dilemma posed by Judge Bench's dissent, 
Judge Jackson quickly asserts that the appellant has noted, 
"there has been no official interpretation by Salt Lake County 
which would bind or influence the court's interpretation of the 
county ordinances." 836 P.2d at 800. Certainly the majority 
opinion implies that had there been such an official 
interpretation, the case may have been decided differently. This 
is only logical since the statutory standard of review, which 
does not allow for "de novo" review, would have been invoked. 
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On the other hand, the logical result of Red Barn's reading 
of "illegality" and "de novo" review would be to eviscerate the 
"arbitrary and capricious" portion of the statutory land use 
standard; thus throwing localities into a tailspin by changing 
decades of Utah land use law precedents which provide for 
substantial deference to local land use decisions, to include 
local interpretations of their own ordinances, and limited 
judicial review. 
Consider the possibility: All land use decisions by 
localities and their boards of adjustment involve, to some 
extent, the interpretation and application of their respective 
development codes to the facts and circumstances of a particular 
case. Consequently, under Red Barn's reasoning, any losing party 
in every land use case, to include cases involving conditional 
use permits and subdivision plat approvals, can claim the action 
of the board or commission to be illegal and demand "de novo" 
judicial review. Red Barn's interpretation of "illegality" would 
functionally swallow all of the other standards of review and 
disrupt the intent of the legislature to allow for limited 
judicial review in land use cases.5 
5
 The County is aware of the recent case of Brown, et. al. 
v. Sandy City Board of Adjustment, et. al., Case No. 970156-CA 
(decided March 26, 1998). In that case, a three member panel of 
the Utah Court of Appeals determined that no deference is due a 
board of adjustment's interpretation of its own ordinance. Brown 
at note 5. To substantiate its position the Brown court cited to 
10 
The Patterson case is instruct '"»-', 893 P .2d ot «i0...:„ Ii i 
that, case, the Utah County Board of Adjustment approved a special 
exception for an airport and Larry Patterson, a competitor who 
o w n e d a n o t. h e r p r i v a t" (:;i < :i i i j.) o i: I n f P W I I I I I -.. ;> : n v\i ,.-i y , a p p e a i e d t h e 
decision of the board. Ixi. -it; t»iH, The court considered two of 
Mr, Patterson's allegations. 
Firs dL r.-^  i ^ c, . •: . jt„-. •_- c A : .c t ne a. L^e 
development njjt standard toi crcmotinu roc:ic heaitn, safety, 
and welfare wao mr-t - +~he jpr ; ioariL wne 
specie * -\* - ^ - r^  L-Lsoii assert-a tiioti t:>e board's 
interpretation ar.c application :f this -'ode standard \*ov wron 4. 
However, the court did not describe 1 111 I.I^ LH. J,S HH- JVMJ i.he 
Patterson and Ben Hame Corp, , As ha^ UJ.ready been discussed and 
will be further discussed herein, neither Patterson, nor Ben Hame 
Corp, stand for the proposition cited by the Brown court. The 
clear indication in Patterson is that the opinion of Judge Bench 
in Ben Hame Corp.; namely, that deference is given to a 
locality's interpretation of its own ordinance, is the 
controlling Utah law. 893 P.2d at 608. Additionally, as noted 
in footnote 4 herein, even Judge Jackson attempted to distinguish 
between interpretations of local zoning ordinances by judge's and 
local officials in Ben Hame Corp.. For Brown to assert that the 
law has inexplicably changed, would effectively overrule 
Patterson, the which certainly was nc' •"* mtemplated in Brown. 
Furthermore, the Brown case, :.u itself; is distinguished fron 1 t- hi-
present case on its facts. In Brown, the issue was over the 
interpretation of a substantive requirement of the development 
code, while here it is over the interpretation of a procedural 
requirement, the necessity of site plan review. As noted herein, 
a disagreement over procedure is not an "illegality" giving rise 
to "de novo" type review within the meaning of the state statute. 
possible illegality of board action in its interpretation of the 
development code, but rather it was an issue over the 
11
 [a] rbitrariness of the [b]oard's [f]inding.n Id. at 605. The 
Patterson court spent the next three pages of its opinion 
discussing the meaning of the code standard to determine whether 
the board's interpretation and application was arbitrary. 
Ultimately, however, the Patterson court concluded that it should 
give substantial discretion to the board's interpretation and 
application of its development code standard because "the Board 
is in a much better position than we are to achieve the desired 
goal of proper zoning as determined by the county commission." 
Id, at 607-08. The court went on to find that there was 
substantial evidence in the record supporting the board's 
determination that the code requirement was satisfied. Id. at 
608-09. 
The County would suggest that the circumstances presently 
before this Court are akin to this Patterson allegation wherein 
the interpretation and application of a development code 
provision was ultimately left to the discretion of the board as 
long as there was substantial evidence supporting the decision in 
the administrative record. This reading of Patterson is 
consistent with U.C.A. 17-27-708(6) and Ben Hame Corp., 836 P.2d 
at 807 (J. Bench, dissenting), which was expressly adopted in 
Patterson, 893 P.2d at 608. As noted in the Brief of the 
12 
Appe 11 ant Summ,i t Connty at: page 2 3 , :i t :i s a 1 so cons i stei 11: w:i t:I I 
t l le pi ii ] osoph/y tl lat administrative agencies should be allowed 
discretion in the interpretation ot i.heir own regulations. 
Morton International
 f Inc. \ 1 kuditiuq JJIV . i i n 11 . i , 5 8 6 
(Utah 1991) . 
Second, the Patterson court considered whether the proposed 
c o n s t r u c t i o n a ml r:»p e i; a t i o ir i i>l: 1 11e a :i i s t r 1 p ' ' j. oiated a specific 
provision oi law concerning airport turning zones. Mr. Patterson 
alleged that the board was committing a;, I • ---..-. • • UIA i tig 
the applicant I Iiihj I lit- I m . .„;;:; : ;•> ;. :ie ohai_ge o: 
i h e g d t ' . . »'ner*-:r: r \- r'.or: stated uil review the action 
' ": correctness ' * J1- *5r-
--
4
--* , < .-. iting a sp^c.iiu pionibition -.hat was 
c o m -~ary Z'> ±a^, a<: , ' * ^ iatinq tne Fair rousinc A'"1" 
. i r*^ >-y I aw^ Th" '"• • %' •*. ierring 
- . j _ •-i r : ::. * _. . s*. ,^..J,M oificiaLs as to tao correct 
procedure or: process under its --wn development code. As Black' s 
!.javv? Dictionary -r'---.- ' • ' . I I f J H I i I
 ; i ,\, ""that tfhich is 
M r \ i •;:.•"• pi-^ncipieb -a i^w, as contradistinguished from 
mere rules of prccedu:- Black's Law Dictionary, 5th ed. 
673 U 9 7 9 ) ™ r t " i •"• 1 . 
Here, t no ^: . ; . h^ ^ m m i t County Foard of Adjustment' _n 
interpret in:: "to correct proc^dur^ *-^i*~ \ = -i ;< . • ••
 f 
nam*" . ^ U u n i u . n be •nc-uyn of as 
13 
an illegal action. The only illegality that could be alleged is 
if the County's Director or Board did not have the proper 
authority to render decisions on the issuance of building 
permits. However, it is undisputed by both state statute and 
local ordinance that they have that authority. See U.C.A. 17-27-
704 & 1002; Code, Sections 1.9 (e) (2) [a] [1] & 4.2(e)(1). 
In sum, to suggest that an illegality exists whenever a 
party disagrees with the interpretation of the zoning regulations 
by the board of adjustment would swallow the limited judicial 
review contemplated by the legislature and, under Red Barn's 
reasoning, allow for "de novo" review in all land use cases, thus 
blurring the line between the branches of government by 
functionally transforming trial courts into zoning commissions or 
super zoning boards. See generally, McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations 3rd ed., Vol. 8A, Section 25.278 (1994).6 
II. A FINAL SITE PLAN IS NOT LIMITED TO CONDITIONAL USES. 
Red Barn suggests that the County is treating its project 
like a "conditional use" and asserts that only "conditional 
uses," not "permitted uses," have a final site plan requirement. 
(Appellee's Brief, pp. 12). Red Barn dwells on Sections 3.6 and 
6
 As to Red Barn's references to Sandy City v. Salt Lake 
County, 827 P.2d 212 (Utah 1992), Ben Hame Corp., and Beaver 
County v. Utah State Tax Commission, 916 P.2d 344 (Utah 1996), 
the County relies upon its argument in its appellate brief. 
(Brief of the Appellant Summit County, pp. 24-27) . 
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\ ' t n makr Its arqument II- wf VC-M 1 h«-,ti I I s e d iuns are 
i n[y a pa it ol a larger whoJe. VaiLOUS code sections, such as 
- , -n.o 6.14 (a I (!) discus^ s ; ~a r : a n s a n d t h e i r 
ai * ^ -o i' i " i i i . | u-i. ;•
 ( :,. to other development 
appl. .dLxoi.. . .-..- noted in the Brief oi c.i:e Appellant Summit: 
County, these sections, w:i th others read as a whole cl^ai 1\ 
requ;i re a f :i i ia] site p 1 ai i : 'f p ei . •. .-..., commercial or niuit i - f amily 
uses, within which Red Barn's Timberwolf Lodge project clearly 
falls. 
I''u.i t: I'leiiiioi. c, contrary to Red Barn's argument, nowhere in 
Sections 3.6, 3.7, or 4.6 does it ever state that a site plan is 
not- required f or a permi 11ed commerc:i a ] • :: i i i in; i ] t: :i f ai i i:i ] y i ise . 
, j , _
 r H E S N y D E R V I L L E B A S I N DEVELOPMENT CODE, AS IT PERTAINS 
TO THE REQUIREMENTS FOR FINAL SITE PLAN APPROVAL, ARE 
NOT AMBIGUOUS 
"h^- •"'•••;•.• -i"i' . . . m g u H g e ^ f 
the Code snows tnat .^.; ambiguity exi.r.s. -'Appellee's Br -r_, - >. 
J 2 - 1 3 ) . However, th^ rlp-^r Janguaa0 door: not indio-jr-
commerr . :an escape t rom :. he 
requirements <.-; -.i i.n^„ bii.e p:.an. nere is simply r. .< avoiding 
Section 6.14 id therein ir states 
The Directs- ^av authorize building permits 
for non-residential and multi-family 
dwellings provided that •* • .ina". site plan has 
been approved by the County and construction 
plans have been released by t^ -- bounty 
Engineer emphasis added) . 
It has been Red Barn who has consistently attempted to 
interject ambiguity into the Code by picking and choosing which 
Code sections to recite and which to ignore. The law is clear, 
the Code must be read as a whole in order to give meaning and 
effect to all of its provisions. Patterson, 893 P.2d at 606. It 
is the County's interpretation of the Code, not that of Red Barn, 
which accomplishes the purposes of Patterson. (See Appellant 
Summit County's Reply Brief [hereinafter, "Reply Brief'1], at 2-7 
(Response to Appellee's Summary of the Arguments); Brief of the 
Appellant Summit County, pp. 38-41). 
IV. CHAPTER 4 IS APPLICABLE TO PERMITTED USES. 
There is no evidence that Chapter 4 does not apply to 
permitted uses. Red Barn's argument to that effect is a 
ridiculous one. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 14-15). Section 
3.6(a)(1) states that a "permitted use" must obtain a 
"development permit." Chapter 4 is the part of the Code which 
governs development permits. Consequently, it is clear that 
Chapter 4 will always apply to permitted uses. 
It is no secret why Red Barn does not want Chapter 4 to 
apply to its use, Section 4.12(b) requires a final site plan 
prior to issuance of a building permit. As has been referenced 
previously, the County's interpretation of Section 4.12(b) takes 
into account. Section 12.2.1 of the Guidelines. (Reply Brief, 
supra. at 3-5). Red Barn, however, purposefully ignores this 
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section of the Guidelines in it1! nttf-mpt I misi. ustiue Section 
I I • I ' . ' 
Assuming, hiw-v-r, * :iat Sect ior ": , ^ "he Guideline! >1H 
not. exi°*~ Pr* : M " : -intv c^rnot 
-i. -= . „ p u n u;,^  plat, approval : , t.-rn-: *•.'•' ; :ses, .^.i (2) 
that Sect lot *].12-i as : -qaii :na h-- r k ^ r r rt * 
approval, is <"«nl\ 1 ^ icdl i i I i,, j}.pluj/i Lo conditional uses, 
a i e u. 11 e r nonsense. 
* .nibitic ? i f" * ~ ] ':ns ana 
County's •" • .
 ( . „ .mmary .: . ..- AI-J ;.'.^* -., iRep^y 
Brief, supra. at -, i 'ounty •-an an i :T w i ^ -r, v ^  ?it-^ p an etna 
platting reauirements of all develoi 
-•-••: ... u s e s . c_.* . *.. : -.'.•-.• ^  v 4 (i) 
Red Barn's allegations of arbitrary application * ~; 
v.;oae to single family units as "lots of record" was n- r 
substantiated before the trial court. The County's position on 
such vested single family lots has been a consistent one in which 
it requires the applicant to obtain a minor permit. Code, 
Sections 2.2(65) & 2.2(69); Guidelines, Section 12.2.1 & Chapter 
15. See also R. at 309-10 (Memorandum of Director Dotson). 
Contrary to Red Barn's assertions, Section 2.2(69.6) states that 
a minor permit applies to " [a]11 single lot or single unit 
residential uses on existing parcels that would otherwise be 
rendered unbuildable pursuant to the density restrictions of 
Section 5.13 herein." In other words, minor permits apply to 
single family units that are "lots of record" under the Code. In 
point of fact, given the County's interpretation of Section 
4.12(b), the Director has applied the Code very consistently. 
Red Barn's attempt to interject an irrelevant issue into its 
argument is simply an attempt to deflect attention away from the 
appellate issue -- ^ " i ^--^ -•. i.te plan required for the Red Bairn 
project? 
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Application to conditional uses. Red Barn fails to 
explain why, if its illogical for permitted uses to be subject to 
both plats and site plans, it's not equally illogical to require 
such for conditional uses? Additionally, how can Red Barn 
assert that it is a correct reading of Section 4.12(b) to require 
site plan and plat approval of conditional uses when Section 3.7 
of the Code, which discusses the requirements for a conditional 
use permit, mandates only a site plan and not a plat? Lastly, 
Section 4.12(b) references numerous other permits which have no 
relation at all to conditional uses; such as a "master 
preliminary plat," "specific plan," and "development agreement." 
That, in itself, makes Red Barn's position that Section 4.12(b) 
applies only to conditional uses inconsistent with the specific 
language of that section. 
In sum, the County admits that the literal language of 
Section 4.12(b) would require all development activities to 
submit to both a final site plan and plat process. However, Red 
Barn's insistence that this should not be construed to apply to 
permitted uses is contrary to the rules of statutory 
construction. Furthermore, Red Barn's interpretation that it is 
more logical to read Section 4.12(b) as only applying to 
conditional uses is inconsistent with Section 3.7 and the plain 
language of Section 4.12(b). The more logical reading is that 
espoused by the County, who uses Section 12.2.1 of the 
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i i , 1111 111 • i win I'M t o g e c h e r w i t h S e c t i o n 8 . 1 4 ia J ( I ) of r he Code , 
r e q u i r e t h a t Red B a r n o b t a i n J f i n a l s i t e p l a n f o r i t s T i nil •<• J " r If 
Lodge p r o j e c t p r i o i I » ; ; v« M| I I n i i b J i i i q p e i m x t . iSee R e p l y 
BJ i (I J , s u p i i , a t <! » . 
" SECTION 5.17 OF THE CODE SPECIFIES ADDITIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT STANDARDS WHICH ARE REQUIRED PRIOR TO THE 
ISSUANCE OF A BUILDING PERMIT. 
:.o.i ;.-.u;.:. is correct that Section 4.12 of the Code is not the 
only reference to requirements for building permit en, (Appellee's 
Bri^t fip rii , IVu j .! ij i ng pcnuils are discussed in a variety of 
code sections • • 4 . 12 , 5 . 17, 6 . 1.4 , etc . However, Red Barn is 
confused wh^! * cnoqents *"hn: zh^ *•-, \; 
- , : . *:•.;:::*_;. . . . iai Seonicr b.l/ . s :_ 
conflict w::.:t section 4 . 1./ \\ • . (Appellee's Brier \ ! - In;. 
Se<"*~ i •"•" , uues . v m t 
T • i i . -: :es nhe r e q u ^ i e m ^ n u t r r n a . c o n s t r u c t i o n . sc 
p r o c e e d in t c c c i d a n c - w : t : an a p p r o p r i a t e i p v n ] n ^ r n r : t n*--"1 
Fed 3ar : : :.- i r . - r t ;•_. j-„ _.: j . . , >i 
. . . . oas<- ^-ci , ,n . . ' >a n o r d e i r-^ t h e Code t o 
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4 . i 2 ^ y , a^ JLIIL*- : 1 - * ! . i l e l i n e s , 
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 Section 2 of the Guidelines clearly states that it is V u 
assist County staff and applicants in the administration and 
implementation of the Code." 
ly 
and 6.14(a) (1) clearly require a final site plan for Red Barn's 
project as a prerequisite for a building permit, and Section 
5.17(a) would clearly require compliance with that site plan as a 
part of the building permit process. 
Perhaps the confusion in Red Barn's position is in its 
failure to understand the purpose of Chapter 5 of the Code, and 
thus Section 5.17. As Section 5.1 explains 
Establishment of Development Standards. 
(a) Purpose. The purpose of these 
development standards is to protect the 
general health, safety and welfare of the 
citizens of Summit County, and to implement 
the Snyderville Basin General Plan by 
controlling the type, location, density, 
intensity, and other characteristics of 
development within the Snyderville Basin 
Zoning District. 
(b) All development orders and development 
permits shall comply with the provisions of 
this Chapter, the standards contained herein 
and the policies of the Snyderville Basin 
General Plan. Such compliance shall be a 
condition precedent to the issuance of a 
development order or approval of a 
development permit. (emphasis added). 
So Chapter 5 contains the "development standards" which are 
implemented in "development permits." As has already been 
discussed, Chapter 4 regulates development permits. Final site 
plans, as well as building permits, by definition, are 
development permits. Code, Section 2.2(43). Section 5.17 is 
then merely a series of specific development standards for 
20 
building permits, which are in addition to all of the other 
general development standards in Chapter 5 that apply alike to 
all development permits. 
VI. SECTION 6.14 APPLIES TO RED BARN. 
Red Barn desires to distinguish Section 6.14(a)(1) because 
it specifically and unequivocally requires Red Barn to have final 
site plan approval. (Appellee's Brief, pp. 16-17). 
Chapter 6 of the Code discusses "public improvements." 
Section 6.14 deals with the issuance of building permits and 
certificates of occupancy, and attempts to ensure that all public 
improvements that are on a final subdivision plat or a final site 
plan are completed. Section 6.14(a)(1) specifically references 
how those improvements will be satisfied in the case of non-
residential and multi-family uses, which are the exact type of 
use which Red Barn proposes in its Timberwolf Lodge project. 
The applicability of Section 6.14 to Red Barn was discussed 
at the June 19, 1997 hearing of the Board, 
Chair DeGray asked about Section 6.14, and 
Mr. Poole felt that did not apply because a 
public improvement required by the plat or 
site plan was not involved. Planner Deis 
explained that, for an applicant to get from 
the road to his property, the right-of-way 
must be crossed, requiring an encroachment 
permit, which would be a public improvement. 
(R. at 321). Based upon the factual evidence before it, the 
Board ultimately determined that Section 6.14(a) (1) did apply. 
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(R. at 316). Red Barn is merely attempting to find a loophole in 
order to ignore the express language of Section 6.14(a)(1). 
However, no loophole exists. 
VII. THE GUIDELINES ARE CONSISTENT WITH THE COUNTY'S 
POSITION, 
As has been previously explained in this Reply Brief, the 
Guidelines are consistent with the County's interpretation of 
Section 4.12(b). In fact, as discussed, the County has read 
Section 12.2.1 in Red Barn's favor, interpreting it to mean that 
only a site plan is required, not both a site plan and plat. 
The distortion here is not in the County's reading of the 
Guidelines, as Red Barn asserts, but it is in Red Barn's attempt 
to read into the Guidelines that which is not there. Red Barn 
reads "Building permit, use by right" in Section 4.4.3 of the 
Guidelines as referring to "permitted uses." (Appellee's Brief, 
pp. 18). For Red Barn's interpretation to be correct, a 
permitted use would need to be a property right. However, as is 
well established in the State of Utah, "an owner of property 
holds it subject to zoning ordinances enacted pursuant to a 
state's police power." Patterson, 893 P.2d at 607. As such, "a 
landowner has no vested right in existing or anticipated zoning." 
Western Land Equities, Inc. v. City of Logan, 617 P.2d 388, 392 
(Utah 1980) (quoting Avco Community Developers, Inc. v. South 
Coast Regional Comm'n, 553 P.2d 546, 553 (Cal. 1976)). Hence, 
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the "use by right" referred to in the Guidelines cannot possibly 
be a reference to a "permitted use," rather it is a reference to 
a "vested right." A "permitted use" is zoning (Section 3.5), 
which is not, by definition of the Utah Supreme Court, vested 
under law. If this were not the case, once any permitted use in 
a zoning district were established, it could never be changed 
because the owner would have acquired a right in its continued 
existence. Such a result would functionally end zoning in the 
State of Utah. As can be seen, Red Barn's interpretation of 
Section 4.4.3 is simply not plausible. 
VIII. RED BARN'S INTERPRETATION IS CONTRARY TO PUBLIC POLICY. 
Of utmost importance to the disagreement over whether a 
final site plan is or is not required of the Red Barn project is 
the public process and how the impacts of this project on the 
community are addressed. 
The purpose of zoning and permitting regulations is to allow 
impacts on the community to be taken into consideration by local 
government, and to the extent reasonable, require the developer 
to provide for some type of mitigation of those impacts. Summit 
County's permitting system in the Snyderville Basin is structured 
in such a way as to accomplish this by providing for two 
important influences on the planning process: (1) public input, 
and (2) a planning commission recommendation. 
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The purpose of public input into a large project, such as 
Red Barn's, is easy to understand. Generally speaking, the 
County planning staff depend upon the neighbors and other 
interested parties to bring information on impacts to the 
forefront in a public forum. This is information which the staff 
may have no other way of knowing about. 
The purpose of planning commission involvement is just as 
essential to the public process. The planning commission is the 
County Commission's duly appointed planning experts from the 
community at large. The County depends upon the advice of these 
individuals to ensure that the impacts of the project are 
reasonably mitigated. 
The mechanism which the County Commission has elected to 
provide for public input and planning commission involvement is 
through site plans and plats. Code Sections 4.6, 4.7, & 4.12(b); 
Guidelines Chapter 7. 
In essence, what Red Barn has attempted to accomplish is to 
thwart the public process and avoid the presentation of its 
project to the community in a public forum. The County 
Commission implemented a permitting system for a purpose. Red 
Barn's reading of the Code is contrary to that purpose. 
Consequently, Red Barn's position, in the opinion of the County, 
is simply contrary to public policy. 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court failed to follow the statutory standard of 
review, which grants deference to the decision of the Summit 
County Board of Adjustment. To compound the error, the trial 
court failed to properly apply the rules of statutory 
construction, which show that the Snyderville Basin Development 
Code requires a final site plan for the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge 
project prior to issuance of a building permit. 
Under the appropriate standard of review, this Court should 
conclude that the Summit County Board of Adjustment's 
interpretation of the Snyderville Basin Development Code, with 
regard to the Red Barn Timberwolf Lodge project, is reasonable, 
reverse the decision of the trial court granting Red Barn summary 
judgment, and instead, grant judgment in favor of Summit County. 
DATED this day of April, 1998. 
Davicl L. Tnomas 
Deputy Summit County Attorney 
Attorney for Appellant 
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